Research

Evaluating Large Language Models for Antisemitic Incident Classification

By Karina Halevy, Julia Mendelsohn, Chan Young Park, Yulia Tsvetkov, Maarten Sap

Authors

Karina Halevy, Julia Mendelsohn, Chan Young Park, Yulia Tsvetkov, Maarten Sap

Artwork

Hili Slav

The Problem

Most automated tools for detecting antisemitism online have been built to spot hateful language — slurs, threatening rhetoric, coded expressions. The authors argue that this leaves a serious gap. A large share of real-world antisemitic harm does not show up in speech alone. Incidents recorded in civil society reports, news articles, and official records — vandalism, harassment, exclusion from campus events — often contain no recognizable hate terms, but they are exactly the events practitioners need to track.

Halevy et al. propose a different task, which they call hateful event detection. Instead of asking whether the language in a post is hateful, the task asks whether a written report describes a real-world incident of hate-motivated harm, and if so, what kind. The authors illustrate the distinction with a sample text that a popular toxicity-scoring tool rates as only 6.7% toxic — close to "clean" — even though it describes clearly antisemitic graffiti. They argue that monitoring harm at scale requires moving beyond language-level signals to structured classification of what actually happened.

The practical relevance is considerable. Organizations responsible for tracking and responding to antisemitic incidents now receive more reports than human analysts can process.

Approach and Findings

The authors test two large language models — OpenAI's GPT-4o and Meta's Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct — across four datasets:

  • AMCHA: 4,410 reports of antisemitic incidents on US college campuses, curated by the AMCHA Initiative. Each is labeled with one of two broad categories (Targeting or Expression) and one of nine more specific types, including Physical Assault, Discrimination, Genocidal expression, Bullying, Denigration, Historical Antisemitism, and Condoning Terrorism.
  • ADL-HEAT: 4,522 incidents from across the US, labeled as Harassment, Vandalism, or Assault.
  • Synthetic: AI-generated descriptions of non-antisemitic but Jewish-related events (e.g., a Passover seder, a Jewish folk dance class), used to test whether the models wrongly flag harmless content.
  • Campus-News: 5,275 articles from five university newspapers (Oct 2022 – Dec 2024), with a 225-article subset hand-coded by experts.

The authors also varied how they asked the models the question — sometimes just providing the incident description, sometimes adding definitions of the categories, sometimes including a worked example. This lets them see which kinds of additional information actually help, and for which kinds of incidents.

On the simple "is this antisemitic?" question, both models perform well. GPT-4o correctly identifies between roughly 91% and 98% of antisemitic incidents (depending on dataset and prompt) and never wrongly flags items from the Synthetic dataset. Llama's false-positive rate is higher and rises from 1.56% to 13.36% when definitions are added — a gap the authors flag as material for real deployment.

The paper's central finding concerns fine-grained classification: the optimal prompting strategy depends on the kind of incident. 

  • For rhetoric-oriented incidents (classical tropes, genocidal imagery, conspiracy invocations), adding definitional context yields the strongest gains, lifting the weighted F1 score — a standard measure that balances correct detections against false positives and false negatives — from 56% to 67% (Historical 61.8% → 74.7%; Genocidal 57.2% → 73.6%).
  • For action-oriented incidents (physical assault, vandalism, suppression of assembly), in-context examples outperform definitions, improving weighted F1 from 56% to 66%.

The authors read this as reflecting what each kind of prompt activates: stable cultural knowledge for rhetorical categories, situational specificity for action-oriented ones.

The authors note one interpretive caveat. AMCHA treats Targeting and Expression as mutually exclusive and prioritizes Targeting when both apply. This means some apparent model "errors" may reflect a taxonomy choice. For instance, models often label swastika graffiti as Expression (Historical + Genocidal), while AMCHA codes it as Targeting.

Some failure modes persist. Bullying and Discrimination stay below 50% accuracy under all conditions, and the models struggle with indirect references that rely on cultural background knowledge the models fail to draw on. When applied to the full Campus-News corpus, the best-performing setup flags 6.9% of articles as describing antisemitic events — with substantial variation from 0.9% (Daily Illini) to 13.8% (Columbia Spectator). The mix of Expression versus Targeting also varies: 80.6% of flagged incidents in the Michigan Daily are coded as Expression, while the Columbia Spectator is closer to evenly split. On the human-annotated validation subset, the model catches most antisemitic incidents (high recall) but produces a meaningful share of false positives (lower precision), with an overall binary F1 of 35.7%. The authors take this to support using the system as a first-pass filter for human reviewers rather than as a standalone classifier.

Implications

The authors argue that specificity in definitions and annotation guidelines is central to building systems that detect social harm reliably — a claim they extend beyond AI to the human annotation practices that produce training and evaluation data. For practitioners, the implication is that the prompting strategy should be matched to operational purpose: definitional context for monitoring rhetorical content, labeled examples for tracking documented physical incidents.

The per-outlet variation in flagging rates and Expression/Targeting distributions is itself informative. Targeting-heavy reporting may indicate where on-the-ground interventions are needed; Expression-heavy reporting may point toward education-oriented responses. For researchers, the formalization of hateful event detection as a distinct task — together with the public release of AMCHA and Campus-News — provides a foundation for further benchmarking. The authors are explicit that the work does not advocate a normative stance on contested definitions of antisemitism: they restrict their taxonomy to categories on which both the IHRA and Jerusalem Declaration definitions agree, and note that future researchers should adapt categories to their own frameworks. They also identify a generative extension: distinguishing descriptions of hateful events from descriptions of responses to those events (counterspeech, policy actions, solidarity demonstrations).

More from this issue

Research

Mapping Affective Polarization in YouTube Shorts: A Data-Driven Analysis of Political Communication During the 2023–2024 Israel–Hamas War

Miehling addresses a methodological and empirical gap in the study of online political communication, particularly in the context of highly polarized conflicts such as the Israel–Hamas war. The author argues that digital communication consisting of user-generated content is often shaped by emotive cues that signal ideological alignment and provide insight into polarization and sentiment dynamics. However, much of the existing research on communication focuses on small-scale qualitative studies, which cannot capture such patterns on a large scale. A related problem is that computational methods capable of analyzing large volumes of text — including a technique called Aspect-Based Sentiment Analysis (ABSA), which assesses sentiment toward specific entities mentioned in text (e.g., "Israel," "Hamas," "Palestinians") rather than just the overall mood of a passage — have not been sufficiently adapted to politically charged domains. ABSA is widely used in commercial settings (for product reviews, for example); its application to political communication remains comparatively limited. Most existing computational studies focus on micro-blogging platforms such as Twitter/X, leaving algorithmically driven, visually oriented environments like YouTube Shorts understudied despite their growing importance. The author argues that YouTube Shorts play an increasingly important role in understanding accelerated communication domains, in which user-generated and state-funded media content shape the digital climate mediated by recommendation algorithms. Under these conditions, affective polarization — the emotional and moral alignment of users toward collective actors like Israel, Zionists, or Palestinians — becomes central to engagement. The paper argues that scalable tools for systematically mapping these evaluative patterns — in which individuals dislike and distrust those with opposing political views – remain underdeveloped in such platform-specific contexts.

Perspective

Governability-by-Design: Closing the Accountability Gap for Agentic AI in Digital Ecosystems

Digital-harm governance is entering a new phase. For the last decade, regulators, platforms, and researchers have focused on content, accounts, and recommendation systems: what is posted, who posted it, whether it violates policy, and how far it spreads. That framing still matters, but the rise of agentic AI shifts the problem toward whether partially autonomous systems can be meaningfully observed, constrained, and interrupted once deployed across digital environments. This is especially urgent where exclusion, harassment, and hate circulate across platforms. As early as mid-2024, OpenAI reported attempts by covert influence operations to use its models for multilingual content generation, persona creation, and cross-platform posting support. Meta's adversarial threat reporting tells a similar story, documenting coordinated inauthentic behavior across Facebook, Instagram, X, Telegram, YouTube, TikTok, and other services, including the use of generative AI for fake personas and synthetic media (Franklin & Torrey, 2024). Taken together, these reports show that AI-enabled coordination already complicates attribution, enforcement, and timely intervention across multiple platforms and jurisdictions. Agentic AI systems are generally understood as systems that can pursue goals through multi-step action rather than merely respond once to a prompt. In practice, this includes systems that can call tools, browse the web, manage memory, operate across applications, and adapt based on feedback. Not every AI agent is equally agentic: a narrow customer-service bot differs from a more open-ended system that can browse, message, trigger tools, and iterate toward a goal. Consequently, the governance challenge grows as autonomy and environmental access increase.

Legal

Without Anchor: Limits of Digital Harm Governance

Picture a person who wakes up to a coordinated campaign against their name. Across dozens of platforms, hundreds of accounts cite one another and adapt their language to whoever pushes back. The campaign is persistent and tailored. It is also, in the legally relevant sense, without an anchor. This is no longer just a thought experiment: an ecosystem is being built for AI agents to socialize, trade, and launch tokens autonomously. Against that backdrop, two capabilities, the autonomous swarm and mid-operation reprogramming, expose a problem that the law governing digital harm is structurally unequipped to solve. A legal anchor is a provider, operator, controller, or human decision-maker at whom obligations attach and toward whom liability can be directed. But these capabilities inflict harm without one. Can an autonomous agent that inflicts harm on a third party, with no human in the causal chain who decided to inflict it, be redressed under frameworks that were built on the assumption that someone, somewhere, made that decision?